Название: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Автор: John A. Nagl
Издательство: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0275976955
Год: 2002
Формат: PDF
Страниц: 272
Для сайта: litgu.ru
Размер: 13,3 МБ
Язык: Английский
Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.